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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
This is an appeal from a final order of the Eighth 
Circuit Court of Utah County, State of Utah, denying Defen-
dant's Motion to set aside the Default Judgment taken in the 
subject case and is taken pursuant to Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals, Title II, Rule 3(a), U.C.A. 
STATEMENT SHOWING NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The nature of the proceedings herein are an appeal by 
the Defendant-Appellant from a final order entered by the 
Eighth Circuit Court, Utah County, State of Utah, Judge 
Joseph Dimick denying Defendant's motion pursuant to Rule 
60(b) for an order setting aside the Default Judgment taken 
by Plaintiff against Defendant. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The determinative rule is Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, stated verbatum as follows on page iv. 
iii 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
HBLIEF PROM JUDGMENT Oil ORDER 
(a) Clerical Mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or 
other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or 
omission may he corrected by the court at any time of its own initialive 
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court 
orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may -he so 
corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and there-
after while the appeal is pending may he so corrected with leave of the 
appellate court, 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly Discovered 
Evidence; Fraud, Etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
roiiri may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal 
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the fol-
lowing reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b) ; 
(3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), mis-
representation, or other misconduct of an adverse par ty; (4) when, for 
any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally served upon 
1 he defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed 
to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment 
has been satisiied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon 
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; 
or (7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for 
reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than three months after the judg-
ment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its 
operation. This Rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain 
an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The pro-
cedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these Rules or by an independent action. 
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff/Respondent (hereafter "Timpanogos") submits 
that the only issue presented on appeal is whether the trial 
court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to 
set aside the default judgment entered herein. Defendant-
Appellant (hereafter "McDonald") has stated that an addition-
al issue should be considered that Timpanogos is not the true 
party in interest and would receive unjust enrichment on the 
apparent belief that Timpanogos would receive double payment, 
having been reimbursed by the subrogee insurer, Utah Farm 
Bureau Insurance Company. Timpanogos submits that this is 
not an issue. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Defendant, Dennis McDonald dba Mac Builders was 
personally served with a Summons and Complaint in this matter 
on September 19, 1987. (Addenda attached hereto, P. 1, 2, 
3)-
2. The Defendant did not respond to said Summons and 
Complaint and a Judgment was taken on or about October 27, 
1987, thirty eight (38) days after personal service was 
effected. (Addenda attached to Appellant's brief, third and 
fourth page). 
3. After said Judgment had already been taken the 
Defendant called Plaintiff's counsel concerning the Judgment 
and at that time stated that he was aware that he had been 
served but had forgotten about the matter because he was busy 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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with other business matters, (Affidavit of Taylor D. Carr, 
attached to Appellants brief addendum, Pages 16 through 19). 
4. McDonald claims in his Affidavit that he called 
Timpanogos attorney before the twenty (20) day period was up, 
however, Timpanogos attorney denies this (Affidavit of Taylor 
D. Carr, Appellant's addendum, supra). 
5. Nowhere in McDonald's Affidavit does McDonald state 
that he was told at any time that he did not have to file an 
answer to the Complaint herein. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is no showing that the lower court abused its 
discretion in refusing to set aside the Default Judgment. 
Defendant sets forth a lengthy statement of his meritorious 
defense, but has failed to show the threshold requirements 
for setting aside a default pursuant to Rule 60(b) U.R.C.P. 
as set forth in State by and through D. of S. S. vs. Mussel-
man, 667 P. 2d 1059 (Utah 1983). 
McDonald further claims that Timpanogos is not the true 
party in interest and would receive double recovery if 
awarded this judgment, however, this claim is unmeritorious 
because this is a subrogation action on behalf of Utah Farm 
Bureau. 
2 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT 
McDonald asserts that he should be given relief from the 
Default Judgment entered against him pursuant to Rule 60(b), 
U.R.C.P., however, McDonald does not make it clear which 
section of that rule should apply. It appears from 
McDonald's Affidavit that he would rely on Rule 60(b)(1) 
which concerns excusable neglect, mistake, inadvertance or 
surprise. McDonald also sets out a lengthy statement of what 
his defense would be. It is clear that McDonald must show 
the elements of excusable neglect (or any other reason 
specified in Rule 60(b)) before the Court can consider his 
contention that he has a meritorious defense. State, by and 
through D. of S. S. vs. Musselman, supra. The lower court 
failed to find the necessary elements pursuant to Rule 60(b) 
and denied McDonald's motion to set aside the default. The 
lower court is given a broad latitude of discretion in ruling 
on such motions and this court should not reverse the lower 
court's decision unless an abuse of discretion can be shown. 
Mayhew vs. Standard Gilsonite Co. 376 P. 2d 951 (Utah 1962) ; 
Board of Education of Granite School District vs. Cox, 384 P. 
2d 806, (Utah 1963), stating that a "patent abuse" of 
discretion must be shown. The lower court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Defendant's motion to set aside the 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Default Judgment. What appears to be one of the most recent 
Utah cases discussing all of the issues presented here is 
Musselman, supra. In that case the Utah Supreme Court made 
it clear that a Defendant under these circumstances must 
first show cause why the Default Judgment should be set aside 
before he can show that he has a meritorious defense. In the 
Musselman case the lower court did find sufficient cause 
under Rule 60(b) to set aside the judgment but went on to 
rule that the Defendant had not shown a meritorious defense. 
The Supreme Court in discussing the case, however, discussed 
both requirements in setting aside a default judgment and 
made it clear that the threshold issue of excusable neglect 
must be shown before the Court will consider whether the 
Defendant has a meritorious defense. The court in this 
connection stated that while they are in accord generally 
with the doctrine that the courts should be liberal in 
granting relief against default judgments, they also ack-
nowledge the existence of the broad latitude of discretion 
which is accorded the trial court on ruling on such motions 
citing Mayhew vs. Standard Gilsonite, supra. The court 
further in quoting from Air Chem Intermountain Inc. vs. 
Parker 513 P. 2d 429 (Utah 1973) stated as follows: 
The trial court is endowed with considerable 
latitude of discretion in granting or denying a motion 
to relieve a party from a final judgment under Rule 
60(b)(1), U.R.C.P., and this court will reverse the 
trial court only where an abuse of this discretion is 
clearly established .... the rule that the courts will 
incline towards granting relief to a party, who has not 
had the opportunity to present his case, is ordinarily 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
applied at the trial court level, and this court will 
not reverse the determination of the trial court merely 
because the motion could have been granted. For this 
court to overturn the discretion of the lower court in 
refusing to vacate a valid judgment, the requirement of 
public policy demand more than a mere statement that a 
person did not have his day in court when full 
opportunity for a fair hearing was afforded him or 
his legal representative. 667 P. 2d at 1055. (Emphasis 
added). 
In applying this rule of law to the case at hand, one 
must read through McDonald's Affidavit on file to determine 
which statements in the Affidavit apply to his assertion that 
he is entitled to the first element required to set aside a 
default under Rule 60(b). He Must show therein the elements 
of excusable neglect or any other reason set forth in Rule 
60(b). It appears that there are three statements set forth 
in McDonald's Affidavit which would apply to this issue. 
They are as follows: 
1. After being personally served with the Summons and 
Complaint in this matter McDonald called Timpanogos7 attorney 
during the twenty (20) day period to find out what the action 
was about. (Although Timpanogos7 attorney denies that this 
call ever took place). 
2. After the judgment was entered against him, McDonald 
called Timpanogos7 attorney again and discussed the case; 
3. That McDonald is not trained in the law nor has he 
been involved in litigation and is not schooled in the Rules 
of Civil Procedure and was unaware of the requirements with 
respect to filing an answer to complaints. 
It is interesting to note that although McDonald claims 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
he had two conversations with Timpanogos' attorney, not once 
does he state that he was told he did not have to file an 
answer to the Summons and Complaint which was served upon 
him. The Summons and Return of Service are attached hereto 
as Addendum 1 and 2, showing that McDonald was personally 
served and that the Summons clearly states that he must file 
an answer in writing within twenty (20) days of the date of 
service. Default was not taken until thirty eight (38) days 
after service of process and although Timpanogos' attorney 
denies that he ever had any conversation with McDonald prior 
to the time of the default, even taking McDonald's assertions 
at face value, he has not set forth sufficient cause under 
the case law to show that the lower court abused its discre-
tion in refusing to set aside the Default. For example in 
Musselman the defendant was hospitalized or convalescing 
during a three week period after he was served. The only 
evidence in this case for McDonald's excuse is that he is not 
schooled in the law and did not think he had to file an 
answer after calling Timpanogos' attorney. (Timpanogos' 
attorney states in his Affidavit that what McDonald really 
said was that after he was served he became so busy he forgot 
about the matter). 
In Warren vs. Dixon Ranch Co., 260 P. 2d 741 (Utah 
1953), the fact situation is somewhat similar to the case at 
hand, although the defendant in Warren had even a stronger 
argument. In Warren the defendant stated that after the 
?• 6 
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default was taken plaintiff's attorney made an oral promise 
that the defendant could have more time to answer. Further-
more, Dixon claimed to have been ill at the time of service, 
and finally, the defendant stockholders claimed that they 
received no notice of the action in time to defend their 
interests. The court found that such was not sufficient ex-
cusable neglect so as to allow the vacation of the default 
judgment, stating that "... the movant must show that he has 
used due diligence and that he was prevented from appearing 
by circumstances over which he had no control". 260 P. 2d at 
743. (Emphasis added). Also in Warren the Supreme Court 
stated that illness alone is not sufficient to make neglect 
in defending one's action excusable. 
With respect to. McDonald's claim that he is not schooled 
in the law, and thus should be relieved from the judgment, we 
find the case of Board of Education of Granite School 
District, supra, where the defendant's excuse for setting 
aside the default was that he thought the summons was invalid 
and, therefore, paid no attention to it. The court refused 
to set aside the default based upon that excuse. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
THIS IS A SUBROGATION ACTION AND MAY BE BROUGHT 
IN THE NAME OF THE SUBROGOR. THERE WILL BE NO 
^,
 (, UNJUST ENRICHMENT. 
McDonald states that if he were required to pay this 
judgment that Timpanogos would be unjustly enriched by 
receiving double payment. This argument needs little 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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discussion because it is clear that this is a subrogation 
action which has been brought in Timpanogos' name by the 
subrogree, Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. The two letters from 
Utah Farm Bureau to McDonald which are attached as addendum 
to his brief make this clear. The right, in fact the 
requirement, under the strict rule of common law of the 
subrogee to bring an action in the name of the subrogor is 
almost universal. 73 Am Jur 2d Subrogation, Section 137. In 
the event of recovery such would go to the subrogee insurance 
carrier who stands in the shoes of the subrogor after payment 
is made and, therefore, there would be no double recovery by 
Timpanogos as asserted by McDonald. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the case law cited herein as well as the 
facts of this case, there has been no showing that the lower 
court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the 
default judgment. Furthermore, there is no showing that 
Plaintiff would be unjustly enriched. Therefore, Plaintiff 
respectfully requests that the lower court ruling be af-
firmed. 
DATED and SIGNED this 17th day of June, 1988. 
TAYLOR DPARR 
i TAYLOR D. CARR 
Attorney for Defendant-
Respondent 
8 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that I mailed four copies of the 
above and foregoing RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, postage prepaid, this 
17th day of June, 1988, to: 
Gary H. Weight, Esq. 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 2 00 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
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~TAYLORD7 
Attorney/for/ Defendant-
Respondent 
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t ^ M C E SERVED^ ^ U >: -,
 ! 
J: \Hr, >'*< 
TAYLOR D . CARR 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
350 South 400 East, Suite 114 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-0888 
DATE & TIMB' / ^ . 
CAPACITY ccPMcn A , f/^ >'((•* •' / 
a V,;:.™?*/-, PROCESS SFRVPn ./(-' ' " ' ' • if'<• ' A 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
TIMPANOGAS VILLAGE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DENNIS McDONALD dba MAC BUILDERS! 
Defendant• 
SUMMONS 
Civil No. ?73d0^gvCA/ 
YOU ARE HEREBY SUMMONED and required to file an Answer 
in writing to the attached Complaint with the Clerk of the 
above entitled Court and to serve upon or mail to Plaintiff's 
attorney, Taylor D. Carr, 350 South 400 Eastf Suite 114f Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111f a copy of said Answer within twenty 
(20) days after service of this Summons upon you. If you 
fail to do so, Judgment by default will be taken against you 
for the relief demanded in said Complaint, which has been 
filed with the Clerk of the above entitled Court and a copy 
of which is hereto annexed and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this \&\ day of September, 
SERVE: Dennis McDonald 
627 West 1700 North 
Orem, Utah 84057 
TAYI^R D. CARR 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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AFFIDAVIT OF PROOF OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
8 SS
- jjju^^ W^/JryrljJ ^ ^ - fJ< w — A ) e vru^ /// " A•' 01-*-<zs- * 
COUNTY OF ) 
I ^^221&. LJ^fZ. ? being first duly sworn or\ 
oath derioses and says: 
I am a citizen of the United States over the age of £1 years 
at the time of service herein, and not a party to or interested 
in the within action and that I received the within and hereto 
annexed. 
jUd^ZWQ^^ 
on the l^day o f mZfiJXMtJuiJiA^^ « 198^, and served the same upon, 
^'Jj^rVr^^ ft)\ ._T^ Cr^YL^^Jrz t he , w i t h i n named defendant, by 
d e l i v e r i n g t o and leav ing a t r u e cooy o f the s a i d _ _ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ _ 
A_ Jr£Z?^f^^_ w i t h_J&3241d*. MtJlzilJLd.-----
a suitable person over the age of 14 years, at the following 
address, _ _ ^ _ 7 _ _ ^ ^ _ / _ 7 f _ l „ ^ l | ? <2^^jj£yL-. • 
I further certify that on the document/s served, I endorsed 
the date, olace of service, and added my name and official title, 
if any, thereto at the time of such service. 
Dated this_^J£day o f _ , ^ ^ ^ ^ r 2 ^ ± ^ ? 19&7 
Subscribed and sworn before me thisjz?£day of£ 
My commission expires: 
M-UZ&-
Service 
M i l a g e +-.L/-3-JL 
Other *_^_ i l< : 5 ' _ 
Total *~JL£~Z£LQ— 
7\ rNTNT-l-K-TTM-TX* O 
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TAYLOR D. CARR 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
350 South 400 East, Suite 114 
Salt Lake City, Utah R4111 
Telephone: (801) 363-0888 
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, PROVO DEPARTMENT 
TIMPANOGAS VILLAGE, | 
Plaintiff, 1 
VS. 1 
DENNIS McDONALD dba MAC BUILDERS 
Defendant. i 
( COMPLAINT 
' Civil No. 
Plaintiff above named complains of defendant and for 
cause of action alleges: 
1. The amount in controvery is less than $10,000.00 
and the damage complained of occurred in Utah County, State 
of Utah, 
2. Prior to the 9th day of February, 1986, Defendant 
caused to be installed in or near the attic of plaintiff's 
commercial building located at 560 South State, Orem, Utah, a 
certain copper water line. 
3. Defendant in performing the duties of installation 
of said water line, did so in a negligent and unworkmanlike 
manner such that on or about the 9th day of February, 1986, 
said water line froze and burst causing damage to Plaintiff's 
building. 
4. As a direct and proximate result of the aforesaid 
1 
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negligent, careless and unworkmanlike conduct on the part of 
Defendant, Plaintiff was damaged in the sum of $4,029.46. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff demands judgment against Defendant 
in the sum of $4,029.46 together with costs incurred herein 
and such other and further relief as the Court deems just in 
the premises. 
DATED t h i s \\ day of September, 1 9 0 ^ / I 
^^V^M-
^AYLpi^f). CARR 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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